

I challenge the State Department to deny that they have been given this information. And let us not have any more silly doubletalk about soft versus hard intelligence. I would rather suspect that the problem is not one of soft or hard intelligence, but rather one of soft or hard heads.

CRITIQUE OF THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REPORT

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. CURTIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, I took this time after putting in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD last Monday, January 28, pages 1099-1107, a rather lengthy critique of the President's Economic Report. At that time I said that I was using a new technique to try to stimulate national debate on economic issues; instead of taking the floor and delivering the speech, I put it in the RECORD so that people would have an opportunity of looking at it and going over the statistics set forth in it. Then, I said, I would take the floor under a special order. At that time I was given a special order for last Thursday. As most of the Members know, the business of the House on last Thursday dragged on and it was around 5 o'clock when I announced that I was having the special order put over until today. So, my purpose in taking the floor today is in case anyone does want to raise any questions about the remarks I made—my thoughts on the President's Economic Report, or make comments thereon—I shall be very happy to yield.

Mr. Speaker, what I want to stress, and it is stressed in my remarks of last Monday, is that the theory on which the President had predicated his recommendations to the Congress to alleviate the economic situation in the country is entirely novel. It is new doctrine; it is new theory. That is no reason, of course, for anyone to shy away from it, but it constitutes plenty of reason why it should be examined carefully and those who are promoting this new theory should be willing to debate the matter forthrightly.

Mr. Speaker, this theory has been lurking around economic circles for several decades.

To put it in capsule, it is a theory of deficit financing at the Federal level. That the Federal Government, by spending more money than it takes in, can stimulate the economy to greater economic growth. This theory, incidentally, was implemented to some degree in the thirties during the Roosevelt depression days. It did not work then but those who promote this theory say that it is wrong to say that it did not work. Their answer is that it did not work because we did not spend enough, that the deficit financing was not enough.

Dr. Heller, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and

Dr. Gordon, who is now the President's Director of the Budget, are of this belief. The proponents of the deficit financing theory say, to prove that we did not spend enough, "Look what did happen when we did spend vast sums of money in World War II." In other words, the argument is that heavy deficit spending in World War II brought us out of the Roosevelt depression of the thirties. I think that that certainly ignores a very basic point, the point of difference between an economy based upon war and one based upon peacetime activities.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CURTIS. I yield.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. The depression came long before Mr. Roosevelt was elected in 1932.

Mr. CURTIS. That is true, but it continued.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Was it not prior to 1932 that we had a depression?

Mr. CURTIS. It started then and continued for—how many years under Mr. Roosevelt?—it continued for 8 years. And I might say to the gentleman that the Democrats took control of the Congress, or of the House in 1930, which has been conveniently forgotten. So I do not think it is an error for me to use this emphasis to counteract the emphasis that has been used for so many years to refer to this depression of the thirties as if it were a Republican—if you want to be partisan about it—a Republican depression, because it was not that, either. I would love to put it in context and say that this was a worldwide economic phenomenon in which we were involved, that Government was at fault in certain areas and private economy was at fault in other areas. We should keep the discussion in balance. But now what I am trying to discuss is economic theory and also political theory, how we move out of a recession or a depression; so it is very appropriate for me to refer to this period of the thirties as a period when this theory of deficit financing was employed and did not work.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. CURTIS. I yield.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Why does the gentleman refer to this as the Roosevelt depression when history shows that unemployment and the failure to distribute goods arose long before Roosevelt became president and continued after he was elected president? The people believed in his policies to such an extent that they elected overwhelmingly a Democratic Congress in 1934 and re-elected Mr. Roosevelt in 1936, and he won almost all of the States of the union in 1940.

Mr. CURTIS. That is right.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. And again in 1944.

Mr. CURTIS. That is right.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. To call that a Roosevelt depression, to place it upon the party that he represented, will the gentleman explain in view of that statement, how in 1958 and 1959 we had a deficit in excess of \$12 billion under the

system controlled by President Eisenhower.

Mr. CURTIS. I will be glad to get to that because I am very critical of that; but let me get back to the gentleman's first question. You have posed another question which I should like to answer.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Will the gentleman yield further at this point?

Mr. CURTIS. I yield further to the gentleman.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Would the gentleman direct himself to that question of the deficit spending that arose in the Eisenhower administration and the budget recommended by President Eisenhower, of which this Congress apparently approved.

Mr. CURTIS. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. It was one of these same matters the gentleman is talking about. Would the gentleman explain what he would do under that situation? What is the difference between that and this program recommended by President Kennedy? Will the gentleman explain the difference?

Mr. CURTIS. If the gentleman will be patient, I will be very glad to.

Essentially there is no difference. Both were in error. I said at that time they were in error. I am talking about the future of the country, not whether the Republican Party gets a leg up over the Democratic Party. I want to discuss the economic theory. Now I will explain the first question the gentleman asked me, as to why I referred to the thirties as the Roosevelt depression, namely to counteract this kind of palaver that has been going on for years, conducted largely by leaders of the Democratic Party, that the depression of the thirties was Republican inspired. Actually it is equally unfair of me, if the gentleman wants me to say it, not to put it in context, to refer to it as the Roosevelt depression. The gentleman is entirely right. This began before Roosevelt became President, but it was not the result of any policies of the previous administration. It was really to a large degree, in my opinion, basic ignorance of all of us in regard to economic laws. I may say that we are largely still ignorant in this field. No one knows enough in these uncharted seas to know just what are the best policies.

Now, if I may revert back to what I was discussing, whether or not this theory of deficit financing actually proved successful in the thirties, because this was a theory that was adopted by the Roosevelt administration, and it is quite clear that it did not. But the one thing that did change the picture was World War II.

I do make this remark, that it is very important for those of us who are interested in peace—and that is all of us, the leaders and members of both political parties—that we must concentrate our attention on an economy based on peace, an economy that will bring economic security based on peace. To refer to a wartime period as being the method of solving economic problems in a peacetime society is gross error.

We can put it in this context: There were 10 million people unemployed in

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As already indicated, the number of earthquakes of a particular size occurring each year in the Soviet Union has been found to be several times smaller than we earlier believed, and our ability to discriminate at a distance between earth tremors resulting from earthquakes and those resulting from explosions has been improving. On the other hand, because of improvements in detection and because of extension of the treaty ban to smaller underground explosions, we must now be concerned with the identification of many small earth tremors. Weighing all these technical considerations, we believe that on balance a reduction in the quota of on-site inspections is to supplement the monitoring system in providing a strong deterrent to the carrying out of clandestine tests. For this purpose, a large number of on-site inspections is clearly unnecessary.

There is still a major gap between the positions of the two sides on the annual quota of onsite inspections required. Last fall Ambassador Dean suggested a figure between 8 and 10 onsite inspections each year. The Soviet Union has returned to its earlier proposal of two or three inspections.

Balancing the risks on both sides, a test ban treaty is very much in the United States interest. While there will always be some risk of cheating and a surprise abrogation, the gains to the United States far outweigh these risks. Moreover, the changes in our requirements for verifying compliance with a test ban treaty would not significantly alter the deterrent effect of such a treaty on the Soviet Union. Our knowledge of methods for long range detection of earth tremors and for judging whether most of them are likely to be earthquakes or nuclear explosions has increased to such an extent that a smaller number of onsite inspections would constitute an adequate deterrent.

III. CONCLUSION

In concluding this statement, I want to stress the importance of a continuing bipartisan effort in this crucial area of U.S. foreign policy. In each administration since the end of World War II, the significant developments in the arms control and disarmament field have always reflected bipartisan effort. In every important conference there have been congressional advisers and observers from both parties. While I cannot speak personally for the entire postwar period, I believe that since I have held my present post of responsibility, no major effort of the United States in the arms control and disarmament field has been made without consultation with representatives of both political parties.

I therefore welcome the interest of the House Republican conference committee in test ban matters and will gladly provide further information if the committee wishes. Let me assure you that no test ban treaty will be placed into effect without either the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification or the approval of both Houses of Congress.

OBSOLESCENCE IS WEAKENING THE NAVY

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. TOLLEFSON] is recognized for 15 minutes.

(Mr. TOLLEFSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TOLLEFSON. Mr. Speaker, according to an Armed Services Subcommittee report dated September 25, 1962, our naval fleet is fast growing obsolete, thereby seriously endangering our

national defense posture. The report says it is a statistical certainty that our fleet will be unable to perform its assigned roles in the years ahead unless the Navy's shipbuilding program is substantially increased.

While our own fleet deteriorates from obsolescence, the Russians are rapidly moving ahead in building up their seapower. They are in the midst of a 7-year ship construction program which could possibly make them the major seapower in the world. Already they have about 400 submarines—some undoubtedly nuclear powered—to challenge the sea supremacy of the United States. With alarming speed and thoroughness they are building commercial and naval vessels. While they recognize fully the importance of seapower, some people in our own Government are losing sight thereof. They must be awakened to the perilous position in which their lack of vision and understanding will place our Nation.

There are 860 ships currently in our naval fleet, 598 of which were authorized during World War II. Their average age is 13 years. Their useful life expectancy is 20 years, based on Navy experience. Thus, they should be replaced or authorized within the next 7 years if the Navy in 1973 is to have the 860 up-to-date ships in being which it says it must have by that date. A 3-year leadtime is required between the date a ship is authorized and the date it joins the fleet. Thus, my assertion and the assertion of the special subcommittee that 598 ships must be replaced or authorized during the next 7 years.

But what is our record with respect to ship replacement and authorization? Between fiscal years 1948 and 1963 we authorized only 24 ships per year on the average. For fiscal 1964 the budget provides funds for only 41 ships. If we do not proceed any faster than 41 ships a year for the next 7 years, we will replace or authorize only 287 ships by 1970. The Navy will be short of not only its goal but its absolute requirements by 311 ships. If that occurs, I predict that in 1973 Russia will have definitely replaced the United States as the major seapower in the world. If that happens, what will be our defense posture, and what will be the defense posture of the free world?

Adm. C. V. Ricketts, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, has said:

We are rapidly reaching the point where we cannot be assured of control [of the seas] unless immediate and effective modernization of our Navy is undertaken.

The report of the special subcommittee contains several startling statements. Included are:

The U.S. Navy is today headed toward a block obsolescence which can have disastrous consequences to this country.

It is a statistical certainty that if this country continues with a shipbuilding program which reflects past history our Navy will cease to be an effective military instrument.

Our Navy, if we can judge by the past, is on an inexorable march toward its own destruction as an arm of our foreign policy

and as an effective agency for national defense.

Where there may be uncertainty about the future requirements of other weapons systems as to type and quantity, there cannot be any doubt, so long as we live in our present geographical environment, that a modern, second-to-none naval fleet is an absolute and fundamental requirement of our national survival.

And even with this realization, a realization which must be shared by Congress and the people generally, we are headed toward a point in time when our Navy will be so reduced in effective strength as to make it physically impossible to perform its roles and missions.

Mr. Speaker, what is Congress going to do with the report of the special Armed Services Subcommittee? Will it simply file and forget it? Or will it live up to its responsibilities to our people? The budget contains funds for only 41 ships. The Navy wants at least 70. The simple arithmetic of the report proves that we must authorize a minimum of 70 per year for the next 7 years.

The special subcommittee deserves the highest praise for its report. I am satisfied that its members will press for their recommendations. Will the Appropriations Committee respond? Will the Congress respond? I sincerely trust so. We cannot afford to let time run out on us.

The SPEAKER. With the permission of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS], the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BRUCE] for 2 minutes.

SOVIET MISSILES STILL IN CUBA

Mr. BRUCE. I thank the Speaker, and I thank the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS].

I have learned on the highest authority from what I consider unimpeachable sources that highly placed officials in Cuba from several major Western Powers friendly to the United States counted the unloading from Soviet vessels in Cuba of 82 to 88 Soviet missiles—not 42.

That would mean there are 40 or more Soviet missiles still in Cuba today and according to my sources the highest officials in the U.S. Government know it.

I can also report that these officials have given full details on this to the U.S. State Department.

The administration has told the American people that 42 missiles were sent to Castro by Khrushchev, and that our aerial and naval observations convinced them that all 42 missiles were removed by Soviet ships. Assuming that 42 actually were taken out of Cuba, by the diplomats' count 40 to 46 missiles capable of striking the heart of the United States still remain on Castro's island.

How long will the State Department continue hiding the facts from the American people? Are we going to be told again that they have suddenly just discovered that these weapons are now in Cuba?

The time to tell the American people the truth is now.

arms control and disarmament agreements with other nations. For the last 4½ years the United States has sought to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty. At various times throughout these 4½ years, the United States has changed its requirements for monitoring and inspecting such a ban. Many of these changes have resulted from increased understanding of the problems involved and from improved techniques developed for their solution. Other changes have resulted from military and political reassessments of the advantages and disadvantages of a test ban treaty to U.S. interests.

This statement will discuss two basic questions which have been raised about the test ban negotiations:

1. Is an effective and comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in the U.S. national interests?

2. What changes in our ability to detect and identify nuclear explosions have occurred which justify changes in our verification requirements, including the number of onsite inspections?

I. A TEST BAN TREATY IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS

1: Advantages

(a) Weapons development:

Without a treaty and with continued unlimited testing on both sides, there would be further increases by both in the efficiency of weapons at the higher yield end of the scale. Our advantage in small-weight, high-yield weapons would most probably diminish. Both sides would enhance their knowledge of weapons effects. In the field of tactical weapons, the Soviets would eventually be able to match our more diversified and numerous arsenal. Overall, the trend would be toward equality between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

With a treaty, improvements in yield-to-weight ratios would come more slowly through laboratory work alone. The U.S. advantage in smaller weapons would persist over a longer time. Some weapons effects phenomena would remain unsettled or undiscovered by both sides. The development of antimissile systems would be slowed down on both sides. Our tactical weapon superiority would persist longer. In general, our present nuclear advantages would last for a considerably longer period.

(b) Spread of nuclear weapons to other countries: It is in our interest to prevent or slow the rate of diffusion of nuclear weapons. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 shows a strong national policy to this end. While a test ban as such would not alone prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, continued testing on both sides would certainly stimulate other nations to acquire them. The rate and motivation for diffusion would be dampened considerably by a test ban treaty.

(c) Establishment of an inspection system on Soviet soil: A test ban which includes provision for some on-site inspection in the Soviet Union has potential significance for progress in other areas of arms control and disarmament and for future relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. It would give both sides experience with inspection and permit us to appraise their cooperation, and in the light of that appraisal, to estimate the cooperation which might be forthcoming in the verification of more significant agreements. It might serve also to "open" the Soviet Union to some extent and to help diminish the Soviets' fear that effective control is another name for espionage. It could lead to the development of a basis for confidence in other agreements.

(d) Elimination of fallout: A test ban treaty should lead to the elimination of whatever danger exists from fallout from United States and Soviet nuclear weapon tests.

2. Disadvantages

(a) Risk of secret preparations and surprise abrogation of the treaty: If preparations for testing were not maintained by the United States after entering into a test ban, it is possible that we would be in a position after a few years in which a surprise abrogation by the Soviets might leave us as much as 18 months behind in our readiness to test. However, in case of agreement, the Government will make it a matter of national policy to maintain readiness to test, and to provide funds necessary for this and for the incentive program necessary to keep competent scientific talent available. Under these circumstances, our scientists should retain the incentives to continue nuclear weapons research and our weapons laboratories should function effectively. This is not insurance against surprise abrogation but would minimize any possibility of a long Soviet headstart in preparations for testing.

(b) Risks resulting from possible cheating: Many important scientific principles involved in nuclear weapons can be studied with nuclear explosions of less than 3 kilotons, including certain of the principles involved in developing possible pure fusion weapons and in reducing weight-yield ratios. This figure is significant for explosions of this size and smaller may not always be detectable. None of the seismic systems proposed by the United States from 1959 on would be capable of detecting with any certainty many explosions of 3 kilotons or less if they occurred in alluvium, a common soil formation similar to gravel. Moreover, artificial decoupling (i.e., the so-called "big hole" technique), might permit considerably large yield explosions without detection.

However, for the weapons developments and knowledge of weapons effects which are of primary concern to us, and which might make a substantial change in the military balance in a way which would be unfavorable to us, clandestine, underground testing would be unsatisfactory. Moreover, the point of diminishing returns in improving weight-yield ratios is fast approaching. And pure fusion weapons would not be of great advantage to us because they would constitute primarily a cheaper substitute for the explosive component in our already large stockpile of nuclear weapons. Hence, any inhibitions on the development of these weapons would appear to be to our net advantage. There is therefore general agreement within the executive branch that a test ban adequately verified so as to provide reasonable assurance against evasion would be in the interest of the United States.

Furthermore, an evader testing in alluvium would probably have little assurance that the cavity produced by the explosion would not collapse, leading to a large visible surface crater which might itself be detected. Moreover, due to the variability in the size of the seismic signals which can occur from explosions of the same size, an evader could not be sure of evading even seismic detection at low yields by testing in alluvium.

"Big hole" decoupling is both time consuming and expensive. Preparation of a large cavity might itself be detected during the construction phase. Moreover, since this form of decoupling has never been tried on any practical scale so far as we know, a potential evader would again be unsure that he could escape detection. Finally, while single tests might sometimes escape detection by seismic means, a test series would be far more difficult to hide. Yet, little progress can ordinarily be made with individual, isolated tests.

3. Balance of risks

All these factors were considered at length by the President and his top advisers in July and August of last summer. Messrs. John

J. McCloy and Robert A. Lovett as ad hoc advisers joined the Committee of Principals which includes the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President on National Security Affairs and Science and Technology, and myself. This group was unanimous in concluding that the risks of secret evasion and of surprise abrogation were outweighed by the risks of continued unlimited testing on both sides.

II. CHANGES IN DETECTION CAPABILITY RESULTING IN CHANGES IN U.S. POSITION

Over the years there have been numerous reassessments of the technical problems involved in detecting underground nuclear explosions. These reassessments have resulted from actual observations of earth tremors over a period of years and from extended research along lines originally recommended by the Berkner Panel Report on Seismic Improvement in 1959. These reassessments have occasionally produced changes in the U.S. position. I will discuss here only those developments which have occurred since the United States submitted a complete nuclear test ban treaty on April 18, 1961, even though there were others before that which produced changes in our monitoring and inspection requirements.

The first of the significant reassessments was the establishment of a better capability for long-distance detection of earth tremors caused by nuclear explosions or earthquakes. This makes it possible to propose a simpler and more economical system for long-range detection, and to rely on stations operated by the United States for the detection of earth tremors in the Soviet Union. Since we would not place primary reliance on Soviet-manned stations to detect such tremors but only as auxiliary tools to gain knowledge about the special features of earthquakes in the Soviet Union, we need be much less concerned about the possibilities for cheating at these stations. Operation of its own system by the United States has the advantage that its size, efficiency and utilization are all under our direct control, and that a great reduction in cost is possible.

The second significant technical reassessment is that an earlier estimate of the number of tremors from earthquakes in the Soviet Union which might be confused with tremors from nuclear explosions has been shown by actual observation and research to be several times too large. Since there are fewer actual earthquakes which produce tremors similar to those of an explosion, the number of onsite inspections needed to identify the cause of any observed tremors is less.

The third significant reassessment is that our ability from a distance and without onsite inspection to ascertain that some earth tremors are caused by earthquakes and not explosions has been steadily improving. In a recent study of the annual earth tremors located in the Soviet Union by stations operated from a distance, over half gave indications of being earthquakes on the basis of such seismic criteria as first earth motion. Somewhat less than another third were found to be unlikely possibilities for nuclear tests based upon nonseismic criteria such as their general geographic location and the detailed characteristics of the area of the tremor's origin.

In 1958, when the test ban negotiations began and we knew less than we now know about earthquakes and nuclear explosions, the United States asked for as many on-site inspections as there were unidentified earth tremors above 5-kiloton yield. In 1960, we proposed 20 on-site inspections each year. In 1961, we proposed a sliding scale ranging from a high of 20 to a low of 12.

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Whereas due to the continuing inaction and incision of the United States Government and the following offensive weapon "quarantine" of Cuba in October 1962, and commenting on the negotiations entered into between Khrushchev and the United States, mostly secret in nature, including the abandonment of on-site inspection of offensive weapons in Cuba, Khrushchev has unenacted and is implementing the "Khrushchev doctrine" as a replacement for the "Monroe Doctrine" as he restated the Communist aims in the Western Hemisphere at the recent Supreme Soviet when he stated: "Socialist Cuba exists. Cuba remains a beacon of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the Western Hemisphere. The impact of her revolutionary example will grow. The Government of the United States has given a pledge not to invade Cuba"; and

Whereas Castro, on January 16, 1963, announced his intention to use his externally supported massive military power to continue the enslavement of the Cuban people and to "bring the masses to battle" through revolution in Latin America; and

Whereas if the Monroe Doctrine is to be preserved it must be restated and fully enforced at this critical period when communism is openly and notoriously arming Cuba with massive modern weapons, tens of thousands of Russian troops, technicians and advisers, electronic missile jamming and tracking devices and "fishing" ports capable of accommodating Russian missiles, all of which constitutes a military capability of such proportions that it is offensive in nature and design; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the international Communist movement operating through the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from enslaving the people of Cuba and threatening the security of the Western Hemisphere, and from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability enslaving the freedom-loving people of Cuba and endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

SEC. 2. That the Congress of the United States urges the President, in accordance with existing law, to take, and supports him in taking, jointly with other free nations or unilaterally, such political, diplomatic, economic, or military action as may be necessary to implement and enforce the Monroe Doctrine throughout this hemisphere and to continue to encourage adherence to the principles of self-determination and human freedom.

TEST BAN VIEWS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, as you are aware, the Republican conference committee on nuclear testing is receiving papers from various experts on the nuclear testing question. Mr. Frank J. Johnson, of the staff of the American Security Council, has submitted an analysis

of the views of the Council's National Strategy Committee. Members of the National Strategy Committee are: Loyd Wright, Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, Adm. Ben Moreell, Dr. Robert Morris, Dr. Stefan T. Possony, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Adm. Felix B. Stump, Dr. Edward Tell, and Adm. Chester C. Ward. The analysis does not purport to speak for individual members of the committee, but rather is Mr. Johnson's review of the committee's collective feelings based on numerous studies which it has conducted. The analysis is as follows:

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL POSITION ON THE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN NEGOTIATIONS (By Frank J. Johnson)

It is now generally agreed that the U.S. decision to unilaterally end nuclear tests in 1958 jeopardized national security. Our test sites deteriorated and finally were deactivated. Our scientists went on to other pursuits. When the Soviet Union later resumed its testing, we were caught totally unprepared, and the Soviets went a long way toward closing the nuclear gap. This must never happen again.

There is little evidence to indicate that the Communists are interested in true disarmament; there is certainly no evidence to show any Communist support for the concept of controlled, verifiable disarmament. Nevertheless, the Soviet representative clamors for "general and complete disarmament" in the United Nations and at Geneva. Given the well-known nature of communism and the pattern of Communist activities since World War I, it is logical to assume that their probable aim in the field of disarmament is to support a specific, clear-cut political objective. Stated in simplest terms, it is to increase the power of the Soviet Union in relationship to that of the United States.

Within this general context we must examine Khrushchev's probable purposes in his latest nuclear test-ban proposal. If a treaty is signed, there are three possible dangers to United States security. These are: (1) that a test ban would be a first step toward the inhibition or crippling of the U.S. ability to use nuclear weapons, if need be, in defense of the West; (2) that, failing this, the Soviet could prepare to test, once again, in secrecy, thus stealing another technological march on the United States; and (3) that the terms of the treaty will allow the Soviet to cheat on underground testing without discovery.

As to the first point, it is obvious that Communists consider a cessation of nuclear testing as but the first step toward an increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. Khrushchev himself made this abundantly clear in June, 1958, before the test ban talks had even started. "After the termination of nuclear weapons tests," he said, "it would be possible to raise the question of the powers making a solemn undertaking not to use hydrogen and atomic weapons and henceforth to adopt a decision on the total prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons." The Soviet plan for general disarmament presented at Geneva last April proposed an immediate 100-percent cut in nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets know only too well that a complete cessation of tests will merely serve to shift the pressures of world opinion to the banning of all nuclear weapons and that such a prohibition would be tantamount to the unilateral disarmament of the West.

The abrupt end of the voluntary suspension of nuclear testing brought about by the Soviet in September 1961, illustrates the second danger. While the moratorium lasted, it looked fine. However, while the United States was observing the moratorium in

spirit as well as letter, the Soviet Union was carefully and secretly doing all the scientific research and preparation for further tests. When they were ready, the moratorium ended. The result was that the Soviet Union gained months of preparation and was able to make more than 40 tests of new weapons before we could get started. There is nothing in the current proposals to prevent a repetition of this. Certainly the fact that the suspension is formalized by a treaty would be no bar to Soviet duplicity. The record of Soviet treaty violations is sufficient proof of this.

With regard to the third danger—that the Soviet might successfully cheat on underground testing—much is currently made of the alleged Soviet "concession" in Khrushchev's willingness to permit up to three on-site inspections in the Soviet Union for all unidentified seismic events. This, however, is not new. It was offered by Soviet negotiators in Geneva in 1960, and rejected by the United States. Our position at that time was that 20 such inspections would be necessary in order to provide reasonable assurance that no clandestine underground testing of nuclear weapons is taking place.

In his letters of December 29, 1962, and January 7, 1963, Khrushchev has done no more than reiterate his earlier willingness to permit three on-site inspections, plus three automatic seismic stations (black boxes) within the U.S.S.R. The United States, on the other hand, has gradually reduced its demands for on-site inspections from 20 to 8-10, and now seems prepared to reduce this even further. The only concessions made since 1960 have therefore been made by the United States.

As a further concession to the Soviets, the United States has now unilaterally suspended its Nevada test shots while the current test-ban negotiations continue. Such a misplaced gesture can have no effect on the outcome of the discussions, but indicates the air of unreality which permeates Washington thinking on the whole subject of disarmament.

Since force or the threat of force is indispensable to the triumph of communism, we should begin to understand the simple truth that Russia will accept a disarmament agreement only if it will result in a net politico-military advantage to the Communists in the struggle for the world. The nuclear test ban fits this criterion. It has been a central feature of Communist "peace" propaganda for many years. It is a vital ingredient in the continuing Soviet effort to alter the military balance in their favor. Consequently, a nuclear test ban as currently contemplated would be inimical to the interests of the United States and the free world.

WILLIAM C. FOSTER'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the Republican conference committee on nuclear testing has asked several experts to comment on the subject of the nuclear test ban in order that the Congress and the American people can be better informed on this subject so vital to the national security. The following is the paper submitted to the committee by Mr. Foster:

WHY THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES NEGOTIATING FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (By William C. Foster)

For the last 17 years, a major U.S. foreign policy objective has been to enhance our security through safeguarded and balanced

know the reason for this seeming weakening in the President's October 22 position. Fidel Castro remains the unfinished business of the hemisphere. The question is: Why?

TAX INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE EDUCATION

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I come before the House today to introduce a bill which sets forth a program that deals with education and with taxes.

Briefly, my bill consists of two major provisions: First tax relief for families with children in college, and, second, tax credit for homeowners for that portion of their real property tax which is used for the maintenance, operation, and construction of public elementary and secondary schools.

There have been in recent years many bills dealing with what we are told is the immediate need for Federal aid to education. In the bill I introduce today I seek not Federal aid to education, not the massive expenditure of Federal funds, which a nation in debt cannot afford, not Federal usurpation of local responsibility, and certainly not Federal control of education.

This bill deals with a different concept, the proper role of the Federal Government with respect to education at all levels, elementary, secondary, and college.

That proper role of our National Government must be the role of helping our people to help themselves without direct intervention or control of the Federal Government. The proper role must consider not statistical pipedreams, but the actual need which exists in the country today for expanding and augmenting educational facilities. By actual need I mean that need not already being met by the traditional local means.

My colleagues, that proper role is to use Federal law to place at the disposal of the people and of the local districts and of the States the financial means to handle the school needs that exist or may arise.

There is nothing strange about this proper role of the Federal Government. It simply is the role of letting the people decide, in their own communities where that decision best can be made, just what their educational system needs are. The decision having been made the proper role of the Federal Government is to equip the people to handle their needs through their local school boards, without direction and control from the Washington bureaucracy.

Providing an education for their children traditionally is the concern and the responsibility of the American family, not of the Federal Government. The vast accumulation of private savings for use in educating children bears witness that Americans believe in this principle.

Besides, most of us here can recall that back in the 1950's many educators were direly predicting a shortage of 400,000 classrooms by 1960. Yet when 1960 rolled

around that shortage, by the educators' own best statistics, was less than 40,000, and the local communities under the leadership of local boards of education were building rapidly to eliminate even that small gap.

Now, let us first consider the problems of college education:

A Federal program to aid our children in attaining a college education should be directed at helping parents do the job. It should avoid outright Federal grants with an accompanying expansion of Federal bureaucracy, Federal supervision and Federal control.

I, therefore, propose a program of tax relief for families with children in college. Such families will be, under my bill, given a substantial increase in Federal income tax deductions for each dependent attending college or junior college.

My bill as it concerns college education contains these major provisions:

First. The taxpayer will be granted an additional deduction from his taxable income for the expenses incurred by him, his spouse, or his dependents, while any of these is attending a college or junior college.

Second. Expenses covered will include tuition and fees charged by the college, books, supplies, equipment and room and board. The amount the taxpayer may deduct would be the actual amount of college expenses, not to exceed \$2,000 for each dependent attending college.

Third. The deduction is available to a taxpayer whose dependent is attending a college, university, junior college, or other institution of higher learning such as medical school, dental school, law school, or any other graduate school.

Let us now turn to the problem of precollege education:

The measure which I propose here today will, if adopted or if incorporated in an overall tax revision, make all the alternative plans for Federal aid to education now under serious consideration irrelevant and unnecessary.

The plan is simple, elemental, and constitutional.

My bill will provide the means for solving current problems and future problems which actually exist in the fields of elementary and secondary education. The basic problem is financial.

If State and local governments in some parts of the Nation are unable to keep pace with their school needs, and recent statistics point out that most local school districts are holding their own rather nicely even in spite of national and State "prevailing wage" laws, it is because Federal taxing power has pre-empted State and local sources of revenue.

Hence, the proper solution to this problem is for the Federal Government to restore to local authorities a portion of the tax resources previously taken away.

This is precisely what my measure will do. Here are the major provisions:

First. The taxpayer would continue to deduct the amount of his real property tax from his gross taxable income. After he determines what his tax would be, he then credits against his final tax that

amount of his real property tax which is used for the maintenance, operation, and construction of public elementary and secondary schools.

Second. The tax credit would be the amount actually paid by the taxpayer, not to exceed \$100.

Third. The taxpayer who takes a standard or short-form deduction also would benefit since the credit is taken against the final tax after all exemptions and deductions have been made.

Education experts now estimate that the average annual school tax payment by the some 40 million American property owners is about \$200 each. Allowing for the standard income tax percentage deduction, and adding the up to \$100 tax credit for property owners, it is estimated that between \$3½ billion and \$4 billion would be made available to local governments as an increased tax base.

Experts tell me that amount, if the local districts choose to use it, would be enough to end all financial problems of American elementary and secondary schools.

It should be clearly understood that this tax credit would go to every American property owner who pays school taxes, regardless of the taxpayer's race, religion or economic status.

There are many concrete advantages to this approach to helping elementary and secondary schools. Here are a few of those advantages:

The tax benefits provided would go directly to some 40 million taxpayers.

There would be no danger of Federal control.

There would be no expanding Federal bureaucracy.

Every dollar of tax money thus made available would buy a full dollar's worth of school aid if the local community decided to expand expenditures for education. And the local community knows its needs better than any Washington bureaucrat can.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, let me briefly place in proper perspective the current situation regarding the apparent needs of America's schools.

During the past 2 years we have seen dozens of desperate attempts by the administration to enact some form of direct Federal financial aid to education on a compulsory basis. None of these attempts has succeeded.

I am convinced that the principal reason the administration has been unsuccessful with its compulsory aid plan is the action of the citizens of this Nation, who have year after year taxed themselves in ever increasing amounts to maintain the finest system of public education in the world.

Our people are aware that they are now doing and have been doing for years that which the administration now tells them can only be done by Federal grants-in-aid. Local and State hard work, perseverance and initiative have all but wiped out inadequacies in classroom space and in teachers' salaries.

It is now estimated that the Nation's colleges will have an enrollment capacity of some 5.4 million students in 1965 as compared to expected enrollment of 5.2 million. By 1970 the figures will be some

7.1 million capacity compared to a 6.8 million enrollment. State programs have achieved this positive balance and can continue to do so if tax sources are left available to the States.

State legislatures across the country appropriated \$1.8 billion in State tax funds for higher education in the 1962-63 period. That represents a gain of 24.5 percent over the 2 years. How can the administration claim that the States are refusing to meet the education obligation?

On the secondary and elementary school level we have, since the end of World War II, witnessed the greatest school building program ever conducted by this Nation, all without Federal grants. In the past decade alone more than 500,000 classrooms have been built. And, based on the sale of school bonds for the past several years, there is every reason to believe this high rate will continue.

Last year alone, 72,000 classrooms were built. That is the highest total ever in 1 year.

This increase in schoolroom construction is all the more dramatic in view of the fact that it has been accomplished in spite of this administration's lack of support and encouragement for local solutions.

Mr. Speaker, I submit that it is time for this administration to admit that the people do not want and certainly do not need massive direct Federal grants to education.

I submit that it is time for the Congress to note with pride the enterprise with which Americans are meeting the education problem on the local and State level.

I submit that it is time for this Congress to assist those Americans by releasing from Federal usurpation the tax base Americans need to continue this heartening school progress.

Americans have proved that they know how to manage their money.

Let us give them their money back.

Mr. CRAMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the Record in two instances and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. CRAMER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

[Mr. CRAMER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 227 EXPRESSING THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION IN CUBA, TO RESTATE AND IMPLEMENT THE MONROE DOCTRINE, TO ENCOURAGE ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMAN FREEDOM, AND CALL FOR COMPLETE INVESTIGATION BY CONGRESS

(Mr. CRAMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, it is amply evident that the Communists are in fact implementing the Khrushchev doctrine as a replacement for the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere—witness the continuing and alarming arms buildup in Cuba—the maintaining of tens of thousands of Russian military, advisory, and technical personnel in Cuba—the building of a number of so-called fishing ports with depths and dockage services capable of servicing and harboring Russian submarines and the installation of electronic counterequipment capable of jamming or tracking missiles launched from Cape Canaveral.

It is further evident that Castro is bent on using this massive military and espionage capability to keep the Cuban freedom-loving people in slavery; and, as late as January 16, bragged of his intention to incite the masses to battle in Latin America.

It is obvious, due to its inaction and indecision, that the U.S. Government is lacking in the determination, desire, or intent to rid this hemisphere of Castro and communism in Cuba and the threat that it poses to the United States as well as the Latin American countries.

With these facts indisputably established, I believe it is imperative that the Congress of the United States take action immediately because the situation is far more dangerous today than it was when the limited Cuban resolution was passed on September 26, 1962. It is obvious that the so-called quarantine against offensive weapons of October 1962, and the negotiations that have taken place since then, mostly secret in nature, have emboldened the Communists even to the extent that Khrushchev at the Supreme Soviet recently stated as Communist policy and intention:

Socialist Cuba exists. Cuba remains a beacon of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the Western Hemisphere. The impact of her revolutionary example will grow. The Government of the United States has given a pledge not to invade Cuba.

I have introduced a resolution today calling for restatement and full implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, a clearcut repudiation of the Khrushchev doctrine with which the Communists are trying to supplant the Monroe Doctrine.

I recall the efforts of the Republicans, myself included, on September 26, 1962, to amend the limited Cuban resolution as proposed by the administration to clearly restate the Monroe Doctrine and to make certain that it is stated as the policy of the United States to oppose the attempt on the part of European powers:

To extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

This means that the Monroe Doctrine applies to the arming and communizing of Cuba itself, as well as the threat of exporting that communism to other countries or the threatening of the United States with conveniently defined "defensive weapons."

My resolution brings into focus the clear and present danger the massive Communist military and espionage buildup in Cuba poses to the United

States, to Latin American nations, and to the objectives of self-determination and individual freedom. It calls upon the United States, bilaterally or unilaterally, to take whatever steps are necessary to rid the hemisphere of this threat.

I am asking for immediate consideration of this and other resolutions on this subject matter and, in the consideration of these, for the proper congressional committees to make a full study and thorough investigation into the Cuban situation—commitments and negotiations that have taken place, present military and espionage capability buildup, aid and assistance given Castro by Russia and Red China, the real purpose of the increase in merchant ship traffic, the construction of a powerful radio transmitter station in the eastern portion of Havana Province which allows the Soviet military command in Cuba to maintain direct communication with the Reds in Russia and China, the weekly nonstop Moscow to Havana TU-114, 220-passenger, turboprop flights, the twice-monthly service to Cuba of three large and substantial cargo carrying passenger liners, and the stepped-up nonmilitary support of Castro by the Communists.

Congress and the American people should be fully informed and our freedoms should be adequately protected, which can only be accomplished with complete disclosure of the facts and the full implementation of the Monroe Doctrine as the objective of the U.S. Government.

The full text of my resolution follows:

H.J. RES. 227

Joint resolution expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba, to restate and implement the Monroe Doctrine, and to encourage adherence to the principles of self-determination and human freedom.

Whereas, President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and

Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence, despite the fact that such action is clearly in violation of the Monroe Doctrine and the principles of self-determination and human freedom; and

their annuities until the approval of Public Law 85-465 in 1958. Health benefits have also been denied to persons retired from particular agencies (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and Farm Credit Administration) on legal technicalities.

We recommend legislation to extend benefits under the Retired Federal Employees Health Benefits Act to all forgotten widows who first received annuities under Public Law 85-465, and to all others receiving annuities based on at least 12 years of service which terminated with an immediate annuity prior to July 1, 1960.

4. CREDITING LONG SERVICE

Since July 12, 1960, employees who continued in service and made contributions to the retirement fund after they had accumulated enough service to earn the maximum annuity, have received credit for such contributions to purchase additional annuities, thus giving them more than the maximum basic annuity. There are many annuitants who retired before April 1, 1948, with service in excess of 35 years who received no credit for such excess service and contributions. There are many other annuitants who retired before July 12, 1960, who received no credit for contributions beyond the time during which they earned maximum annuities.

We favor an amendment to the retirement laws to require the recomputation of annuities of persons retired before July 12, 1960, who had rendered service and made contributions to the fund after completing the service on which their annuities were based, to bring about annuity increases under a formula of one-half the ratio of such excess service to the service on which their present annuities are based.

5. DISABILITY ANNUITY FLOOR

Disability retirement is a double calamity inflicted by loss of employment forced by loss of capacity to work. This hardship is more humanely recognized in Public Law 84-854, by a disability annuity floor equal to the annuity that could be earned by service to age 60, or 40 percent of the average salary, whichever is less, but this recognition is restricted to persons retired since October 1, 1956.

We favor extension of this annuity floor of the annuity which would have been earned by service to age 60, or 40 percent of the average salary, whichever is less, to annuitants retired prior to October 1, 1956.

6. AVAILABILITY OF RETIREMENT FUND

The retirement fund was established for the purpose of paying benefits under the civil service retirement system, but a provision in Public Law 85-844, approved August 28, 1958, forbids the use of this fund for paying any increase in benefits voted thereafter by Congress. This is an unnecessary restriction and should be removed.

We favor legislation to clarify the fact that the retirement fund was established to pay retirement benefits and to remove any restrictions in such use.

7. POSTAL RATE ADVANTAGES

All labor unions and many other nonprofit associations are enjoying preferential bulk mailing rates under Federal postal laws. Our association headquarters and many of our chapters have been denied this privilege.

We will continue our efforts to obtain postal rate privileges equivalent to those granted labor unions and other nonprofit organizations.

8. PANAMA CANAL CONSTRUCTION ANNUITIES

Civilian workers recruited for service in the Panama Canal Zone during the period of the construction of the canal were promised that all who remained a full period of 2 years would share in the rewards for such service. A generation later, when annuities were

awarded on the basis of such service, those with 2 years but less than 3 years service were excluded from the benefits.

We support the request of Panama Canal construction workers that Congress now redeem the promise to them by granting annuities to 2-year service persons (about 75 survivors) for the remaining portions of their lives.

9. GROUP LIFE INSURANCE

Group life insurance retained after retirement is a very important benefit, and should not be subject to the present rapid depreciation in value at the rate of 2 percent per month until only a fourth of the original amount remains.

We will continue to urge legislation to cut the reduction rate of group life insurance to 1 percent per month and halt the reduction when it has reached 50 percent of the original value.

10. PRICE-FIXING LAWS

Numerous campaigns are underway to enact legislation to authorize price fixing by manufacturers and distributors of food, medicine, and other products needed by annuitants. Sometimes such legislation is disguised as a scheme for the protection of trademarked brands, or as a fair-trade proposal, but the real purpose is to enlist the aid of Federal and State courts in forcing retailers to charge us more money for the necessities of life. Our annuity dollars are too precious to be cheapened by legalizing such price-fixing practices.

We urge all annuitants to be alert to laws proposed in our Congress and in our State legislatures which would enable manufacturers and distributors to use our courts to enforce higher prices of food, medicine, and other products necessary for the preservation of life.

11. SOCIAL SECURITY

Many civil service annuitants are also beneficiaries under the social security retirement system, and are interested in social security legislation. We will keep alert to legislative proposals to modify or liberalize social security benefits. At the same time we will honor mandates of numerous conventions and oppose any and all efforts that might have a tendency to combine benefits under the civil service retirement system with those in the social security retirement system.

12. VETERAN BENEFITS

Civil service annuitants who have had military service should have the same opportunity to qualify for pensions and other veteran benefits as annuitants under any other retirement system. We are distressed to learn of a number of cases where the recent small increases in civil service annuities will rob the recipients of greater amounts in veteran pensions. This is not the fault of retirement laws, but is a consequence of restrictions in veteran benefit laws.

While we do not plan to sponsor any legislation in the field of veteran benefits, we will be alert to legislative proposals advanced by others and we will use every reasonable opportunity to present the viewpoints of our members and other civil service annuitants concerning such proposals.

U.S. MUST HAVE PROMPT LEADERSHIP IN CUBAN SITUATION

(Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the demands for U.S. leadership in the Cuban situation are mount-

ing. Almost daily there are speeches delivered on the floors of both the House and Senate calling for another decisive step to be taken to hasten Castro's downfall. Congressional offices bulge under the deluge of constituents' mail urging additional positive expressions of U.S. leadership in meeting the Communist threat in the Caribbean.

Not only are calls for leadership heard in the Congress and across the Nation but Latin America also reverberates with vocal impatience over U.S. inaction. Just last week, on Thursday, January 31, the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States, Dr. Facio of Costa Rica, delivered a speech in Washington calling for the United States to take the lead in the inter-American community. The OAS leader said that the Latin American nations have "but the role of a chorus" in obtaining action on Cuba. However, citing Latin cooperation and enthusiasm for the United States, Dr. Facio stated:

But a chorus may sing with vigor * * * and offer solidarity in pursuing the success of the common enterprise.

Mr. Speaker, the time is ripe for a positive act of U.S. leadership. The American people are ready. The Organizations of American States is waiting to support U.S. initiative.

I was gratified to see that Secretary of State Rusk announced Friday that the OAS had under consideration several of the recommendations I had formerly made that the United States formally propose for adoption. Those recommendations now under study are the ban on the movement of Castro agents throughout Latin America, and the freezing of Cuban Government funds now on deposit in Latin American financial institutions.

I would again like to urge that the United States propose the other recommendations I called for; namely, that the nations of this hemisphere ban relay of telecommunications to and from Cuba, close the seaports of Latin America to vessels calling in Cuba, and close the airports of this hemisphere to airlines engaging in flights to and from Cuba.

Adoption of these recommendations by the OAS would result in effective solitary confinement of Cuban communism in the Americas.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT BENEFITS

(Mr. MILLIKEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MILLIKEN. Mr. Speaker, I have today reintroduced legislation to strengthen the adequacy of our Social Security Act by increasing the opportunities that social security beneficiaries will have for performing work without losing their entitlement to social security benefits.

Specifically, my bill would change the retirement test so that instead of beginning to lose benefits when earnings exceed \$1,200 a year, as is the case under

present law, my bill would provide that a person could earn up to \$1,800 per year without loss of benefits. In addition, the legislative proposal I have sponsored would provide that an individual would not lose benefits for any month in which he had earnings of less than \$150. As a final feature of my bill for earnings over \$1,800 up to \$2,400, beneficiaries would only lose 50 cents of benefits for every \$1 of earnings.

Mr. Speaker, this meritorious liberalization of our Social Security Act is in my judgment in realistic conformity with the facts of present-day living. Our senior citizens are not for the most part interested in completely severing their ties with gainful occupations just because they have reached age 65. Many of them would like an opportunity to continue working on a reduced basis during their late sixties. This will would help accomplish that objective of a phasing out process between full employment and full retirement. It is estimated that upwards of one-half a million beneficiaries would be helped by the change I have proposed in my bill.

While I realize that enactment of the legislation might cause the Government to lose some revenue, I feel that this is the opportune time to bring it to the attention of the Committee on Ways and Means so that they may take it into consideration when writing a final tax bill in line with the administration's tax proposals. It is my understanding that the administration wants to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number of people, and I feel that passage of my bill is most important to a great number of our citizens.

JOINT RESOLUTION ON CUBA

(Mr. JOHANSEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I opposed the joint resolution on Cuba adopted by this House last September 26. I believed it was a trumpet giving an uncertain sound.

I believe that events since then have fully and tragically confirmed this estimate.

I unqualifiedly supported the seemingly strong stand taken by the President October 22. I regret that that strong stand was so soon abandoned.

Six days later on October 28, I expressed the grave concern that our willingness to offer a no-invasion pledge may have "only postponed the decisive showdown." I warned that "we may even have out-Muniched Munich."

Everything that has happened since, and the hard-to-come-by disclosures regarding the situation today, confirm this warning.

During the debate on the Cuban resolution last September, I said:

If we believe that what has happened and is happening in Cuba is already far too much, let us forswear the mafiana policy of endless postponement, of waiting for still direr happenings, and let us call a halt now.

If it is in fact our determination to launch the sequence of successive actions to end this

(Soviet) incursion, to free Cuba from its thralldom, to make secure our shores and hemisphere—let us empower and command such actions.

I believe this injunction is far more imperative today than it was on September 26, 1962.

I believe such a commitment is more imperative now than then from the standpoint of national and hemisphere security.

I believe that an expression of determination on this score reflects more faithfully the overwhelming sentiment of the American people now than it did then.

Accordingly, I have today introduced the following House joint resolution "expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba" and authorizing action by the President:

H.J. Res. 229

Joint resolution expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba

Resolved by the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined to take, jointly with other free nations or unilaterally, such political, diplomatic, economic, and military action as may be necessary:

(1) To secure removal, and thereafter to bar, from Cuba, all Soviet or other foreign Communist military forces, both personnel and equipment;

(2) To liberate Cuba from its present Marxist-Leninist regime;

(3) To neutralize Cuba as a base for Communist subversion, infiltration, sabotage, and aggression in the Western Hemisphere;

(4) To assist the liberated people of Cuba in achieving representative, constitutional government established through free elections; and

(5) To exercise such on-site inspection and supervision as may be required to accomplish these purposes. Be it further

Resolved, That the President is hereby authorized and empowered to implement and execute the policy set forth in this joint resolution.

MRS. CLARE BOOTHE LUCE ANALYZES RECENT CUBAN AND FRENCH SITUATION

(Mr. STINSON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include an article from the Sunday Star.)

Mr. STINSON. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished former Congresswoman and Ambassador from Connecticut, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, wrote an article on U.S. foreign policy that appeared in yesterday's Sunday Star. This article presents an interesting analysis of our recent actions concerning Cuba and France:

POINT OF VIEW—DE GAULLE UPHELD ON NUCLEAR STAND

(By Clare Boothe Luce)

PHOENIX, ARIZ.—The President was asked in the last press conference what he thought of the theory put forward in Europe that the outcome of the Cuban crisis was linked in General de Gaulle's mind with his determination to have his own nuclear deterrent force, because Cuba showed that the United States would not defend Europe.

The President replied that this charge had indeed been directly made, and he indicated

that some Europeans had deduced from the fact that the naval blockade had ended with Moscow in unchallenged control of Cuba, that "since the Soviet developed their own nuclear capacity there is a balance between (the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) and neither would use it, and therefore Europe cannot rely on the United States." This he called "peculiar logic."

But after Cuba not only some, in some parts of Europe but also many in many parts of America, and in Latin America, no longer believe in U.S. commitment to defend other countries from communism, if to do so should mean to initiate a nuclear war with Soviet Russia.

And, the President's remarks notwithstanding, there is much recent evidence that Mr. Khrushchev himself is now thoroughly convinced that once the 400,000 American troops in Germany are withdrawn, America's nuclear commitment will then extend no farther than its own coastline.

KHRUSHCHEV ASSUMES ROLE

If memory serves, after the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion, Mr. Kennedy repeatedly warned Mr. Khrushchev that communism in this hemisphere was "not negotiable." Mr. Khrushchev, strongly suspecting that this warning was merely for U.S. domestic political consumption, boldly seized the opportunity to put it to the acid test: Fully aware that he would be detected in the end, he sneaked nuclear weapons into Cuba, and zeroed them in on the White House.

When the President found this out, quite a long while after Cuban intelligence sources had told him it was happening, his reaction was immediate. He called out the Navy, which called Mr. Khrushchev's brilliantly and carefully calculated bluff.

This was probably precisely what Mr. Khrushchev intended. Mr. Khrushchev had long been in the position of having to lose his face in order to save it. He wanted to lose his ugly nuclear mug—the face of the nuclear aggressor. He was anxious to show the world that he was not the man to start a nuclear war against anybody over a third country, and he certainly wanted to have it made plain that Mr. Kennedy wasn't the man either. A solid basis for negotiations of all kinds, and popular fronts of all kinds, could be built on the foundations of a United States of America-U.S.S.R. nuclear peace pact.

One can only imagine Mr. Khrushchev's satisfaction when his theory vis-a-vis the United States of America military position was proven correct. But he could hardly have been prepared for the next surprise. No sooner had he agreed to remove all the nuclear hardware U.S. air surveillance had spotted, then Mr. Kennedy at once referred to him as a "great statesman" and, to show that there needn't be any hard feelings over the little episode, gave him Cuba.

KHRUSHCHEV REPEATS THREAT

Mr. Khrushchev did not naturally bother to return the President's compliment. He realized, of course, that it had been made to gentle him. (Mr. Khrushchev is as easy to gentle as a king cobra.) A few weeks later at the East Berlin World Communist Congress Mr. Khrushchev was bragging to the world that his missile play in Cuba had achieved its real objective, to scare Mr. Kennedy into giving up Cuba. After accepting the thunderous applause of the 2,500 Communist Party delegates present from 70 nations, Mr. Khrushchev vowed all over again to "bury us," this time with his 100-megaton bombs, but only if we were ever so rash as to initiate a nuclear attack on him.

Ever since Cuba, Mr. Khrushchev has worked hard on his new image. Each passing day he sounds more and more like John Foster Dulles: He will never launch missiles at the United States of America, or Europe.

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As already indicated, the number of earthquakes of a particular size occurring each year in the Soviet Union has been found to be several times smaller than we earlier believed, and our ability to discriminate at a distance between earth tremors resulting from earthquakes and those resulting from explosions has been improving. On the other hand, because of improvements in detection and because of extension of the treaty ban to smaller underground explosions, we must now be concerned with the identification of many small earth tremors. Weighing all these technical considerations, we believe that on balance a reduction in the quota of on-site inspections is to supplement the monitoring systems in providing a strong deterrent to the carrying out of clandestine tests. For this purpose, a large number of on-site inspections is clearly unnecessary.

There is still a major gap between the positions of the two sides on the annual quota of on-site inspections required. Last fall Ambassador Dean suggested a figure between 6 and 10 on-site inspections each year. The Soviet Union has returned to its earlier proposal of two or three inspections.

Behind the risks on both sides, a test ban treaty is very much in the United States interest. While there will always be some risk of cheating and espionage, prohibition, the gains to the United States far outweigh these risks. Moreover, the changes in our requirements for verifying compliance with a test ban treaty would not significantly alter the deterrent effect of such a treaty on the Soviet Union. Our knowledge of methods for long range detection of earth tremors and for reading whether most of them are likely to be earthquakes or nuclear explosions has increased to such an extent that a smaller number of on-site inspections would constitute an adequate deterrent.

In concluding this statement, I want to stress the importance of a continuing bipartisan effort in this crucial area of U.S. foreign policy. In each generation since the end of World War II, the significant developments in the arms control and disarmament field have always reflected bipartisan support.

In every important conference there have been some people who have said that they are not going to sign any treaty. I cannot say that we are going to sign any treaty. But we must not let our hands be held by those who say that. We must make every effort to achieve a treaty in the arms control and disarmament field. We must make every effort to achieve a treaty in the arms control and disarmament field.

The interest of the American people in the arms control and disarmament field is a very real one. The American people want to know that we are doing everything we can to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. They want to know that we are doing everything we can to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. They want to know that we are doing everything we can to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

OBsolescence IS WEAKENING THE NAVY

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. TOLLEFSON] is recognized for 15 minutes.

(Mr. TOLLEFSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TOLLEFSON. Mr. Speaker, according to an Armed Services Subcommittee report dated September 25, 1962, our naval fleet is fast growing obsolescent, thereby seriously endangering our

national defense posture. The report says it is a statistical certainty that our fleet will be unable to perform its assigned roles in the years ahead unless the Navy's shipbuilding program is substantially increased.

While our own fleet deteriorates from obsolescence, the Russians are rapidly moving ahead in building up their seapower. They are in the midst of a 7-year ship construction program which could possibly make them the major seapower in the world. Already they have about 400 submarines—some undoubtedly nuclear powered—to challenge the sea supremacy of the United States. With alarming speed and thoroughness they are building commercial and naval vessels. While they recognize fully the importance of seapower, some people in our own Government are losing sight thereof. They must be awakened to the perilous position in which their lack of vision and understanding will place our Nation.

There are 860 ships currently in our naval fleet, 698 of which were authorized during World War II. Their average age is 13 years. Their useful life expectancy is 20 years, based on Navy experience. Thus, they should be replaced or authorized within the next 7 years if the Navy in 1973 is to have the 860 up-to-date ships in being which it says it must have by that date. A 3-year leadtime is required between the date a ship is authorized and the date it joins the fleet. Thus, my assertion and the assertion of the special subcommittee that 698 ships must be replaced or authorized during the next 7 years.

But what is our record with respect to ship replacement and authorization? Between fiscal years 1948 and 1963 we authorized only 24 ships per year on the average. For fiscal 1964 the budget provides funds for only 41 ships. If we do not proceed any faster than 41 ships a year for the next 7 years, we will replace or authorize only 287 ships by 1970. The Navy will be short of not only its goal but its absolute requirements by 311 ships. If that occurs, I predict that in 1973 Russia will have definitely replaced the United States as the major seapower in the world. If that happens, what will be the defense posture, and what will be the defense posture of the free world?

Adm. C. V. Ricketts, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, has said:

We are rapidly reaching the point where we cannot be assured of control [of the seas] unless immediate and effective modernization of our Navy is undertaken.

The report of the special subcommittee contains several startling statements. Included are:

The U.S. Navy is today headed toward a bleak obsolescence which can have disastrous consequences to this country.

It is a statistical certainty that if this country continues with a shipbuilding program which reflects past history our Navy will cease to be an effective military instrument.

Our Navy, if we can judge by the past, is on an inexorable march toward its own destruction as an arm of our foreign policy

and as an effective agency for national defense.

Where there may be uncertainty about the future requirements of other weapons systems as to type and quantity, there cannot be any doubt, so long as we live in our present geographical environment, that a modern, second-to-none naval fleet is an absolute and fundamental requirement of our national survival.

And even with this realization, a realization which must be shared by Congress and the people generally, we are headed toward a point in time when our Navy will be so reduced in effective strength as to make it physically impossible to perform its roles and missions.

Mr. Speaker, what is Congress going to do with the report of the special Armed Services Subcommittee? Will it simply file and forget it? Or will it live up to its responsibilities to our people? The budget contains funds for only 41 ships. The Navy wants at least 70. The simple arithmetic of the report proves that we must authorize a minimum of 70 per year for the next 7 years.

The special subcommittee deserves the highest praise for its report. I am satisfied that its members will press for their recommendations. Will the Appropriations Committee respond? Will the Congress respond? I sincerely trust so. We cannot afford to let time run out on us.

The SPEAKER. With the permission of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS], the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BRUCE] for 2 minutes.

SOVIET MISSILES STILL IN CUBA

Mr. BRUCE. I thank the Speaker, and I thank the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS].

I have learned on the highest authority from what I consider unimpeachable sources that highly placed officials in Cuba from several major Western Powers friendly to the United States counted the unloading from Soviet vessels in Cuba of 82 to 88 Soviet missiles—not 42.

That would mean there are 40 or more Soviet missiles still in Cuba today and according to my sources the highest officials in the U.S. Government know it.

I can also report that these officials have given full details on this to the U.S. State Department.

The administration has told the American people that 42 missiles were sent to Castro by Khrushchev, and that our aerial and naval observations convinced them that all 42 missiles were removed by Soviet ships. Assuming that 42 actually were taken out of Cuba, by the diplomats' count 40 to 46 missiles capable of striking the heart of the United States still remain on Castro's island.

How long will the State Department continue hiding the facts from the American people? Are we going to be told again that they have suddenly just discovered that these weapons are now in Cuba?

The time to tell the American people the truth is now.

I challenge the State Department to deny that they have been given this information. And let us not have any more silly doubletalk about soft versus hard intelligence. I would rather suspect that the problem is not one of soft or hard intelligence, but rather one of soft or hard heads.

CRITIQUE OF THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REPORT

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. CURTIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, I took this time after putting in the Congressional Record last Monday, January 28, pages 1099-1107, a rather lengthy critique of the President's Economic Report. At that time I said that I was using a new technique to try to stimulate national debate on economic issues; instead of taking the floor and delivering the speech, I put it in the Record so that people would have an opportunity of looking at it and going over the statistics set forth in it. Then, I said, I would take the floor under a special order. At that time I was given a special order for last Thursday. As most of the Members know, the business of the House on last Thursday dragged on and it was around 5 o'clock when I announced that I was having the special order put over until today. So, my purpose in taking the floor today is in case anyone does want to raise any questions about the remarks I made—my thoughts on the President's Economic Report, or make comments thereon—I shall be very happy to yield.

Mr. Speaker, what I want to stress, and it is stressed in my remarks of last Monday, is that the theory on which the President had predicated his recommendations to the Congress to alleviate the economic situation in the country is entirely novel. It is new doctrine; it is new theory. That is no reason, of course, for anyone to shy away from it, but it constitutes plenty of reason why it should be examined carefully and those who are promoting this new theory should be willing to debate the matter forthrightly.

Mr. Speaker, this theory has been lurking around economic circles for several decades.

To put it in capsule, it is a theory of deficit financing at the Federal level. That the Federal Government, by spending more money than it takes in, can stimulate the economy to greater economic growth. This theory, incidentally, was implemented to some degree in the thirties during the Roosevelt depression days. It did not work then but those who promote this theory say that it is wrong to say that it did not work. Their answer is that it did not work because we did not spend enough, that the deficit financing was not enough.

Dr. Heller, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and

Dr. Gordon, who is now the President's Director of the Budget, are of this belief. The proponents of the deficit financing theory say, to prove that we did not spend enough, "Look what did happen when we did spend vast sums of money in World War II." In other words, the argument is that heavy deficit spending in World War II brought us out of the Roosevelt depression of the thirties. I think that that certainly ignores a very basic point, the point of difference between an economy based upon war and one based upon peacetime activities.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CURTIS. I yield.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. The depression came long before Mr. Roosevelt was elected in 1932.

Mr. CURTIS. That is true, but it continued.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Was it not prior to 1932 that we had a depression?

Mr. CURTIS. It started then and continued for—how many years under Mr. Roosevelt?—it continued for 8 years. And I might say to the gentleman that the Democrats took control of the Congress, or of the House in 1930, which has been conveniently forgotten. So I do not think it is an error for me to use this emphasis to counteract the emphasis that has been used for so many years to refer to this depression of the thirties as if it were a Republican—if you want to be partisan about it—a Republican depression, because it was not that, either. I would love to put it in context and say that this was a worldwide economic phenomenon in which we were involved, that Government was at fault in certain areas and private economy was at fault in other areas. We should keep the discussion in balance. But now what I am trying to discuss is economic theory and also political theory, how we move out of a recession or a depression; so it is very appropriate for me to refer to this period of the thirties as a period when this theory of deficit financing was employed and did not work.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. CURTIS. I yield.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Why does the gentleman refer to this as the Roosevelt depression when history shows that unemployment and the failure to distribute goods arose long before Roosevelt became president and continued after he was elected president? The people believed in his policies to such an extent that they elected overwhelmingly a Democratic Congress in 1934 and re-elected Mr. Roosevelt in 1936, and he won almost all of the States of the union in 1940.

Mr. CURTIS. That is right.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. And again in 1944.

Mr. CURTIS. That is right.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. To call that a Roosevelt depression, to place it upon the party that he represented, will the gentleman explain in view of that statement, how in 1958 and 1959 we had a deficit in excess of \$12 billion under the

system controlled by President Eisenhower.

Mr. CURTIS. I will be glad to get to that because I am very critical of that; but let me get back to the gentleman's first question. You have posed another question which I should like to answer.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Will the gentleman yield further at this point?

Mr. CURTIS. I yield further to the gentleman.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Would the gentleman direct himself to that question of the deficit spending that arose in the Eisenhower administration and the budget recommended by President Eisenhower, of which this Congress apparently approved.

Mr. CURTIS. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. It was one of these same matters the gentleman is talking about. Would the gentleman explain what he would do under that situation? What is the difference between that and this program recommended by President Kennedy? Will the gentleman explain the difference?

Mr. CURTIS. If the gentleman will be patient, I will be very glad to.

Essentially there is no difference. Both were in error. I said at that time they were in error. I am talking about the future of the country, not whether the Republican Party gets a leg up over the Democratic Party. I want to discuss the economic theory. Now I will explain the first question the gentleman asked me, as to why I referred to the thirties as the Roosevelt depression, namely to counteract this kind of palaver that has been going on for years, conducted largely by leaders of the Democratic Party, that the depression of the thirties was Republican inspired. Actually it is equally unfair of me, if the gentleman wants me to say it, not to put it in context, to refer to it as the Roosevelt depression. The gentleman is entirely right. This began before Roosevelt became President, but it was not the result of any policies of the previous administration. It was really to a large degree, in my opinion, basic ignorance of all of us in regard to economic laws. I may say that we are largely still ignorant in this field. No one knows enough in these uncharted seas to know just what are the best policies.

Now, if I may revert back to what I was discussing, whether or not this theory of deficit financing actually proved successful in the thirties, because this was a theory that was adopted by the Roosevelt administration, and it is quite clear that it did not. But the one thing that did change the picture was World War II.

I do make this remark, that it is very important for those of us who are interested in peace—and that is all of us, the leaders and members of both political parties—that we must concentrate our attention on an economy based on peace, an economy that will bring economic security based on peace. To refer to a wartime period as being the method of solving economic problems in a peacetime society is gross error.

We can put it in this context: There were 10 million people unemployed in